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Much policy focus has been afforded to the role of “whistleblowers” in raising concerns about quality and
safety of patient care in healthcare settings. However, most opportunities for personnel to identify and
act on these concerns are likely to occur much further upstream, in the day-to-day mundane interactions
of everyday work. Using qualitative data from over 900 h of ethnographic observation and 98 interviews
across 19 English intensive care units (ICUs), we studied how personnel gave voice to concerns about
patient safety or poor practice. We observed much low-level social control occurring as part of day-to-
day functioning on the wards, with challenges and sanctions routinely used in an effort to prevent or
address mistakes and norm violations. Pre-emptions were used to intervene when patients were at
immediate risk, and included strategies such as gentle reminders, use of humour, and sharp words.
Corrective interventions included education and evidence-based arguments, while sanctions that were
applied when it appeared that a breach of safety had occurred included “quiet words”, bantering, public
exposure or humiliation, scoldings and brutal reprimands. These forms of social control generally
functioned effectively to maintain safe practice. But they were not consistently effective, and sometimes
risked reinforcing norms and idiosyncratic behaviours that were not necessarily aligned with goals of
patient safety and high-quality healthcare. Further, making challenges across professional boundaries or
hierarchies was sometimes problematic. Our ﬁndings suggest that an emphasis on formal reporting or
communication training as the solution to giving voice to safety concerns is simplistic; a more sophis-
ticated understanding of social control is needed.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Much policy focus has been afforded to the role of “whistle-
blowers” in raising concerns about quality and safety of patient care
in healthcare settings (Francis 2015; NHS Improvement England,
2016). Whistleblowing is, however, only one type of behaviour for
raising concerns. It is likely to be deployed reactively, after in-
cidents have taken place or weaknesses have been detected, and
only when other efforts to be heard or to take action have been
frustrated. Many more opportunities for personnel to identify and
intervene in concerns about the quality or safety of patient care are
likely to occur much further upstream in the routine interactions oflth and Primary Care, Forvie
ixon-Woods).
r Ltd. This is an open access articleeveryday work, though the exercise of “voice” (Morrison, 2011).
Deﬁned as ‘non-required behaviour that emphasises expression
of constructive challenge with an intent to improve rather than
merely criticise’ (Dyne et al., 2003 p. 109), voice is directed towards
others within the workplace, either to peers (‘speaking out’) or
supervisors/managers (‘speaking up’) (Liu et al., 2010). Voice
behaviour is a form of prosocial and constructive activity (Dyne
et al., 2003), motivated by a desire to optimise performance and
avoid error or harm. The ability of teams and individuals to speak
out when they have concerns, and to accept challenges and input
from others, is often seen as critical for promoting safety in high-
risk settings (Lyndon, 2006; Orasanu and Fischer, 2008). Yet use
of voice may be potentially risky: among other things, it involves
challenging others or disrupting the status quo (Liu et al., 2010).
People's willingness to speak out is thus highly dependent on their
beliefs about perceived efﬁcacy, andwhether they think it will haveunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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to address reluctance to use voice have tended to focus on training
in more effective communication strategies (such as avoiding
mitigated language and using graded assertiveness) (Okuyama
et al., 2014), especially in communicating across hierarchies and
boundaries (e.g. Brindley and Reynolds, 2011). However, inter-
preting challenges in exercise of voice as simply problems of
communication is insufﬁcient. In this paper, we propose that un-
derstanding how to support those who seek to intervene in
potentially inappropriate or unsafe behaviour in healthcare re-
quires an understanding of social control.
1.1. Social control in a ‘company of equals’
Processes of social control e including the establishment and
enforcement of social norms and informal conﬂict resolution
mechanisms e play an important role in regulating behaviour in
interdependent groups (Lazega, 2000). Social norms are ‘standards
of behaviour […] based on widely-shared beliefs about how indi-
vidual group members ought to behave in a given situation’ (Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2004 p. 185). Group members are, in principle,
incentivised to monitor and use informal social sanctions (such as
exclusion) against individuals who violate these norms (Sripada,
2005). Sanctions function to re-enforce social norms and deter
future violations; they tend to be graduated dependent on the
severity and frequency of the violation (Ostrom, 1990). Social
control, exercised through the “informal” use of voice and sanctions
in response to norm violations, is thus a potentially effective means
of identifying and resolving safety concerns without recourse to
external parties and formal corrective systems, including
whistleblowing.
In a healthcare context, early evidence of the importance of
social control emerged from Freidson and Rhea's work, which
examined a group of qualiﬁed physicians working together in a
large US clinic (Freidson and Rhea, 1963). Describing how the
physicians informally monitored each other's conformity to pro-
fessional and social rules and norms, this work identiﬁed that “the
elements involved in the process by which control may be exer-
cised in this company of equals are fairly unbureaucratic in char-
acter”, and included physicians' use of what Freidson and Rhea
describe as “punishments”, including the so-called “talking to”.
Similarly described in Rosenthal's later work on incompetent
doctors in the UK (Rosenthal, 1995), sanctions such as the “terribly
quiet chat” were often (though not always) effective.
This work was important in showing that social control may
facilitate ongoing monitoring of colleagues’ behaviours and prac-
tices and provide the ability to intervene in ways that may mini-
mise burden and conﬂict. But it also showed that social control has
its limitations. Professional and social norms may not always be
aligned with goals of quality and safety; respect for professional
autonomymay preclude clinicians from challenging others; and the
system is reliant on individuals internalising professional and social
norms and being responsive to social sanctions (Dixon-Woods
et al., 2011).
This literature offers an intriguing hint that by the time
healthcare personnel resort to whistleblowing, a failure of informal
social control has already occurred. There is, however, little
empirical evidence of what features of social control are used, and
to what effect, in the context of the modern healthcare environ-
ment; Freidson and Rhea's work predates the era of multidisci-
plinary teams, and Rosenthal's work predates much of the patient
safety and quality movement and major policy shifts.
In this paper, we focus on processes of social control in everyday
clinical practice within multidisciplinary healthcare environments,
outside the formal reporting processes for dealing with incidentsand poor practice. We examine the types of challenges and sanc-
tions used in these environments to prevent or correct behaviours
or actions that may pose risks to patient safety, and we reﬂect on
the role and limits of social control in promoting safe and high
quality care.
2. Methods
This paper reports data from an ethnographic study of a national
programme (Dixon-Woods et al., 2013) to reduce central venous
catheter bloodstream infections (CVC-BSIs) in intensive care unit
(Bion et al., 2013). The interventions introduced as part of the
programme included a checklist designed to promote adherence to
good practice and facilitate personnel in challenging poor practice
in relation to catheter insertion, as well as a number of non-
technical interventions targeting safety culture and multi-
disciplinary communication about safety.
Across 19 purposively sampled adult ICUs across nine different
hospital trusts, authors CT and ML conducted ~910 h of ethno-
graphic ﬁeldwork. We observed day-to-day interactions around
catheter maintenance and care, including how personnel respon-
ded when they had concerns about others' practices or aspects of
patient safety. We recorded instances of individuals challenging or
sanctioning others in response to behaviour or actions that could
potentially risk patient safety. Face-to-face interviews were con-
ducted with 98 ‘shop ﬂoor’ personnel, including 34 consultants
(equivalent to attendings in the US); 14 doctors in training, usually
referred to as “junior doctors”, including registrars (residents in the
US) and physicians in their foundation years (similar to interns in
the US); 28 senior nurses (e.g. nurse managers); 8 staff nurses
(qualiﬁed registered nurses); and 14 infection prevention/micro-
biology personnel (specialised nurses and physicians). We ques-
tioned participants about their feelings and experiences of
responding to concerns about poor practice, and of challenging and
sanctioning others.Written informed consent was obtained prior to
interview; for observations, people were informed and verbal
permissions obtained where possible. Ethical approval for the
study was obtained from Berkshire Research Ethics Committee
[Ref: 10/H0505/2].
Interviews and ﬁeldnotes were transcribed and anonymised.
Analysis of data was based on the constant comparative approach
(Charmaz, 2006). Initially, “open codes” were generated, repre-
senting the signiﬁcance of sections of text. These were then
incrementally grouped into organising categories or themes. Cat-
egories weremodiﬁed and checked constantly in order to develop a
coding frame, which was programmed into NVIVO software and
used to process the dataset systematically.
3. Findings
We identiﬁed a range of informal processes of social control,
including challenges e principally in the form of pre-emptions e
and post-hoc informal corrective interventions and sanctions of
various kinds that were routinely deployed as part of day-to-day
work. Though mostly effective in promoting positive patient
safety behaviours, some unwanted consequences of these pro-
cesses were also evident.
3.1. Pre-emptions
The major form of prospective challenge that we identiﬁed was
that of the pre-emption, which we deﬁned through our analysis as
challenges or corrective interventions that were used to prevent
error or poor or risky practice in real-time. Pre-emptions were used
by colleagues to alert others when they were at risk of violating
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sensitise them to the need to alter their behaviour. They were of
different types, including suggestions and offers of advice or help,
questions, reminders, sharp words, education, and banter.
What we termed “gentle” pre-emptions were often framed in
very polite, mitigated language (O'Hare and Roscoe, 1990): for
example, they took the form of questions, and used qualiﬁcations
such as ‘would’ or ‘shall’. These gentle pre-emptions allowed for
‘face-saving’ work (Brown and Levinson, 1987; Goffman, 1955) e in
which lapses in practice could be attributed to oversights rather
than errors due to lack of care or skill.
The registrar [resident] was getting ready to put the drug into the
patient's central line. She picked up the port [without wiping it with
an antiseptic wipe to reduce the risk of infection] and the staff
nurse immediately said, “I'll get you a wipe for that”. (Fieldnotes,
Unit 15)
By using pre-emptions, individuals were able to prompt others
to correct their behaviour in an unthreatening way that averted risk
of escalation, consistent with research showing that professionals
may ‘shy away from face-to-face conﬂicts as well as direct and
coercive exercise of power’ (Lazega, 2000).
One of the operating room staff said to the consultant [attending
physician], “Do you want the adrenalin turned on?” the consultant
said, “Yes, yes” in a conﬁdent and conﬁrmatory way. The [staff
member] said, “It's just that it was blocked, turned off”, and the
consultant said, in a much quieter tone, almost to himself, “Yes, an
oversight”. (Fieldnotes, Unit 8)
Gentle pre-emptions were used both vertically (from those
lower in the hierarchy to those above) and horizontally (peer-to-
peer). They also occurred across professional boundaries, for
example between nurses and physicians. In this context, hierar-
chical positions were not straightforwardly a matter of different
professions having different status: senior, experienced and long-
standing ICU nurses were, in many of the contexts we observed,
powerful individuals who had considerable inﬂuence in relation to
physicians (especially, but not only, those who had not reached
consultant status); less experienced or more junior nurses, such as
staff nurses were, however, less powerful. Thus, gentle pre-
emptions, though often effective, were a relatively weak form of
challenge and, when deployed in contexts of unequal power, were
often easy to rebuff.
The registrar was still trying to put a central line in the jugular, and
the ungowned consultant moved around to the patient's head to
have a look. The staff nurse said to the consultant, “Oh, do you want
to put a gown on”, and she got a pack out and had it in her hands.
She was offering it towards the consultant. The consultant said, “No
no no no”. The nurse said to him, “Well I'll put the gown on the edge
of the trolley here, and I'll just leave it here if you decide you need
it”. She wasn't successful in getting the consultant to put the gown
on. (Fieldnotes, Unit 14)
‘Bantering’ and the use of humour were alternative approaches
to making gentle pre-emptions. These strategies were commonly
used between those whose position in the hierarchy was close, e.g.
a consultants to experienced registrars, or nurses (of most grades)
and junior doctors. Bantering in these contexts was usually effec-
tive so long as the challenge was given and taken in good spirit; in
these instances, humour softened the challenge, enabling it to be
made without being seen as an assertion of power or an affront todisciplinary status or expertise.
The registrar put the sterile packs on top of the trolley, but without
removing the plastic wrapping that keeps the trolley [cart] clean
between uses. The [staff] nurse was laughing at him, said, “Oh are
you trying to keep the trolley clean”, and the registrar kind of put on
a stupid voice, said “Is it not okay?” The nurse said to him, “No it's
ﬁne”, sarcastically, and the registrar said back jokingly, “Oh well
you know I can always say that <nurse's name> said it was ﬁne so
I'll be okay”, and they laughed about it. And actually, before the
registrar took the trolley into the patient's bedside, he did take the
plastic wrapper off the trolley as he was supposed to, and put the
pack straight onto the top of the trolley. (Fieldnotes, Unit 11)
Not all pre-emptive challenges were gentle nor was humour
used: sometimes they took the form of ‘sharp words’ or insistence.
These more pointed interventions were typically used when the
individual making the challenge perceived an imminent risk of
harm to a patient.
At one point [during a central line insertion by a registrar] the
anaesthetist consultant actually quite sharply said, “Stop”. The
registrar had in fact pierced the artery. (Fieldnotes, Unit 6)
Sharp words drew attention to risks and real or anticipated
mistakes; they were aimed at diverting immediate harm and get-
ting the job done safely. They functioned as deterrents in part by
averting a course of action that might harm or lead to further harm.
Although they were individual corrections, they were, by necessity,
often made in public e in view of other professionals and patients.
This use of voice thus made risks visible to others. Like gentle pre-
emptions, though in a somewhat different way, sharp words dis-
played norms about what was acceptable or the right thing to do,
but did so in a way that could be seen as threatening, potentially
inducing the sense of discomfort or shame that comes from being
reprimanded. Sharp words were thus sometimes accompanied by
an apology e possibly to mitigate against being seen as an overt
display of power or aggression.
The junior doctor moved in to touch the patient, without putting
gloves on or a gown. The [staff] nurse spotted her doing this and she
looked around and said, quite sharply, “Do you want some gloves
and an apron?” Then almost immediately said, “Oh, I'm sorry, I
didn't mean to bark at you”. (Fieldnotes, Unit 14)
3.2. Corrective interventions and sanctions
Corrective interventions weremade ‘after the event’; thesewere
forms of social control that functioned to demonstrate that an error
or violation had occurred or that practice had been sub-optimal.
The forcefulness of these interventions varied: softer, gentler
post-hoc interventions included the use of education and evidence-
based arguments to shape behaviour, whilemild sanctions involved
use of humour. Harder tactics included the ‘quiet word’, public
exposure or humiliation, and, at the extreme, ‘telling off’ or ‘bol-
locking’ (severe or brutal reprimand).
We observed many examples of education to correct behaviour;
most involved senior or more experience personnel educating
those more junior, and they were low-level and unthreatening e
they were based on the assumption that mistakes and violations
are an inevitable part of learning.
The patient had been started on Total Parenteral Nutrition and the
consultant looked at the dose and said [to the registrar], “Oh, we
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the different types of bags that we use?”, and the registrar said,
“No”, and the consultant said, […] “You don't just write TPN here,
you have to prescribe the right bags, I'll show it to you later”.
(Fieldnotes, Unit 14)
[Staff nurse] came in with continence pads […] and said to the
senior nurse rather apologetically, “I know we're not supposed to
use these for an arterial line insertion, but is it ok, I couldn't ﬁnd
[the right pads].” […] The senior nurse immediately responded by
saying, […] “No you are not to use those, the pads contain wood-
pulp and they have found that we really shouldn't use those when
we are putting lines in, because there is a risk of really bad in-
fections because of the woodpulp”. […] Staff nurse said, “Oh you
know I didn't know about that” (Observation, Unit 8)
Referring to or invoking evidence was an approach commonly
used by doctors to challenge their peers, or by senior nurses to
challenge senior doctors. It was founded in the perception that it
difﬁcult for (autonomous) peers to ‘correct’ each other's behaviour
unless they had good reason.
You back up things you do with the evidence, so it comes, not like
“Oh, we do it just because I say so”, but “because those two studies
have demonstrated beneﬁt, this one shows X, Y, Z, and that's why I
think my interpretation of the data is, and that's why I do it the way
what I do”. (Interview, consultant, Unit 15,)
Humour and banter were also used as a post-hoc sanction, just,
as reported above, as they were used as a pre-emptive challenge.
Use of banter and humour to expose or sanction violations was
often very public, and, when used in a context where personnel had
collegial working relationships, it allowed for public norm
enforcement and deterrence for future violations. One way in
which it functioned was as a form of mild shaming and humiliation
(a type of “telling off”).
One of the registrars walked around the corner to where we were
doing the ward round, and she had a red gown and some gloves on,
which should have been taken off when she left the patient's bed
space. […] The consultant turned around and just looked at her in
sort of mock horror and said, “Dr [name]!”, but in a kind of jokey
way, and she immediately knew what he was referring to. […] She
touched her gown and said “oh, don't worry, they're clean, I haven't
touched anything, I haven't done anything yet”, and she dashed off
(Fieldnotes, Unit 15)
The use of humour was not always positive, however: it some-
times risked taking on a bullying tone.
The senior consultant, having moved on from one bed space to the
next, turned around to ﬁnd that there was nobody actually
following him. [… Eventually] the junior doctors, which included a
female, came over, and the consultant said archly, “It's like going
shopping with your wife, you think you're done, she says she's done
and you look back after twenty feet of walking and realise she's not
done”. The female registrar nodded and pursed her lips into a forced
smile. (Field notes, Unit 5)
We observed three stronger forms of disapproval or reprimand:
‘the quiet word’, humiliation, and ‘telling off’ or ‘bollocking’. These
types of interventions were most likely to be used by those higher
in professional hierarchies.
The ‘quiet word’ was a private challenge, directed at correctingindividual behaviour e usually between peers (senior physicians,
senior nurses) and also senior to junior physician. Quiet words
tended to come into play when an individual repeatedly failed to
adhere to good practice, or was seen to be violating fundamental,
‘taken for granted’ social or cultural norms.
One of the doctors can be a bit lackadaisical, but if I try to say,
“Well, come on, you know, think about what you're doing” and,
“Would you do this in theatre?”, and he'll take it on board.
(Interview, consultant, Unit 14)
Exposing and humiliation were stronger public challenges that
relied on using social disapproval to bring behaviour in line with
good practice or norms. Typically used as an escalative strategy
when low-level challenges had failed, they functioned by publicly
exposing someone as a normviolator, using shame, embarrassment
and humiliation to force compliance with norms and deter others
from violation. This tactic was, for example, used by senior nurses
to challenge doctors.
The surgeons […] left the bed space and started to leave the ward,
as they left the [senior] nurse in charge shouted across the ward at
them, after one of the surgeons, “wash hands, wash hands” and he
smiled back at her, smiled slightly wryly and did before he left the
ward. (Fieldwork, Unit 11)
Certain surgeons coming round the unit I almost had to humiliate
them in front of their trainees. And that was very effective because
you could have a quiet word [but] they carried on doing it [failing to
adhere to hygiene precautions], and then I eventually would just
say, “Stop, you're not touching that patient, you haven't washed
your hands, you haven't put an apron on, and I don't care what you
do on your wards but on here you do as we do”. (Interview, senior
nurse, Unit 1)
Adirect and strong sanctionwas ‘telling off’, where an individual
was personally reprimanded (usually by a senior colleague).
Though potentially effective, it risked causing distress, inducing
feelings of being undervalued, or souring relations between col-
leagues e particularly when people felt the telling off was unjus-
tiﬁed or was based on idiosyncratic norms. “Telling off” occurred
mainly within (rather than across) professional hierarchies. We
directly observed relatively few challenges between nurses, likely
because in the ICUs we observed, nurses largely work on their own
with individual patients on a nurse-per-bedspace basis. Nonethe-
less, some examples of nurse-to-nurse “telling off”were reported to
observers.
“I was told off”, she said “I got a real dressing down. All I was doing
was doing what we would do here […] try and take [a patient's
level of] sedation down and so on, [I] was doing that over there, and
I was pulled up 'cos I was told that that's not howwe do it here, the
nurses don't do anything without asking ﬁrst. […] It was the senior
nurse that told me off”. (Fieldnotes, Unit 2)
For those on the receiving end, this type of sanction suggested
that they were careless, poorly motivated, or had deliberately
behaved badly. People resented these implications along with the
outsider status that went with them, and were keen to protect their
identity as ‘good’ and well-motivated professionals.
An extreme form of telling off, ‘bollocking’, was used almost
exclusively by senior doctors towards junior doctors. We observed
only a few examples of it, but when it did occur it was a display of
power that reinforced strong hierarchies and brought behaviour
into line through engendering fear and shame. A bollocking left no
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to adhere to them could have negative consequences.
[At the end of the handover], before the door closed behind the last
doctor leaving the room the senior consultant looked at [registrar],
who was still sitting there with the paper in his hand, and said
[loudly], “You've been here for six months, the handovers need to
get much tighter. You've been doing this for long enough, you need
to get with the programme”. (Field notes, Unit 1)
There was some evidence of graduation of challenges and
sanctions if lower-level efforts failed to bring about change. One
method for informal escalation involved calling on a more senior
colleague to intervene. This was seen as a last resort, but as a useful
supplement to more informal mechanisms in the case of in-
dividuals who were unresponsive to lower levels of social control.
Nurses in particular felt that being able to call on doctors’ own
disciplinary hierarchy to impose harder sanctions could be highly
effective.
[Senior nurse] said there was a time when they were having
problems with a particular doctor who wasn't hand washing and
[…] they'd try to remind him and suggest to him but he still wasn't
doing it, and so she decided to contact [medical director] and just let
him know of the problem. She said the next day when the doctor
came in, he virtually stripped off and showered. (Fieldnotes Unit 11)3.3. Inﬂuences on challenging and sanctioning
Those in the study sometimes found it hard to make effective
challenges. The quality of local relationships, the nature of profes-
sional hierarchies, boundaries, and identities, as well as motivation
to avoid conﬂict and preserve harmony (or the appearance of it), all
strongly inﬂuenced willingness and ability to use mechanisms of
social control. For example, personnel with infection control re-
sponsibilities reported that they recognised the tension between
challenging others for their hygiene and infection control practices,
and the need to maintain good cooperative relationships with their
colleagues in order that they would engage with infection control
programmes and activities. This tension was felt particularly by
infection control staff based externally to ICUs, and sometimes
resulted in their choosing not to challenge in order to avoid
damaging their relationships with ICU personnel.
While we are with the second patient [infection control nurse]
whispered to me “I can see a couple of the doctors have got their
watches on” [against infection control policy]. She said “I won't pull
them up for it while I'm here collecting the data, I don't want them
to see us as constantly policing them or nit-picking. Sometimes I
just have to turn a blind eye. […] It's important we have a good
relationship with the staff so they welcome us in and take on board
our data and work with us.” (Observation, Unit 1)
Using forms of social control such as pre-emptions and sanc-
tions was easier, and more likely to be well received, in contexts
where hierarchies were relatively ﬂat and individuals had estab-
lished good working relationships.
At [this unit] we, as nurses we are very autonomous, […] we
challenge decisions, […] and I think as well it's a sort of a mutual
relationship, whereby actually consultants now ask the nursing
staff is there anything else you would like to discuss. […] We are
very friendly, and so people are not afraid to ask questions. […]
However inexperienced or experienced you may be, you know,
we've got limitations or we've got weak points, so people are not
afraid [to speak up] (Interview, senior nurse, Unit 17)Most ICU nurses do their course now, so you feel you've got the
knowledge behind you, and the training behind you, and that you
know, particularly the junior doctors when they're coming up,
never worked in an ICU, you feel that your knowledge is as good as
theirs, and you feel quite happy to challenge them, and you've seen
bad practice over the years, that you think “not on this unit, not
here, not today, not now”(Interview, nurse, Unit 14)
Though some nurses reported that they were comfortable with
challenging physicians, some physicians reported that direct chal-
lenge in the other direction was potentially uncomfortable, in part
because of a fear that doctor-to-nurse challenge might be inter-
preted as bullying.
I think all of us would feel a bit more careful about the way we did
it, because I think, you know, you've got to recognise […] doctors
are still probably, have a more authoritative role than nurses, that's
still, that power differential is still there. […] I think if you're in a
more senior position, you know, you'd be more cautious about
telling a nurse actually than the other way around these days,
that's my feeling. I certainly would ﬁnd it much easier to challenge
one of my medical colleagues than I would a nurse (Interview,
registrar, Unit 15)
More broadly, in the absence of cultural support, for example
when relationships were not collegial in nature or when previous
attempts to challenge had been rebuffed or poorly received, use of
many forms of social control was more difﬁcult. In some hospitals
in our study, for example, the idea of nurses challenging doctors
was unthinkable.
The senior nurse said how difﬁcult it is for the nurses over at
[hospital], how the consultants […] don't listen to the nurses and
they shout at the nurses. It's going to be really hard for nurses to
challenge them. (Field notes, Unit 2)
It does take quite a level of assertiveness on the part of the nurse to
be able to openly challenge a doctor, it does depend on the doctor,
and it depends on the nurse and it depends on the rank and the age
and experience of the nurse and the doctor. (Interview, nurse, Unit 1)
Accordingly, nurses were sometimes anxious about intervening
in a doctor's actions and about the consequences of their challenge,
and were not always successful in these interventions.
The nurse had said to [the registrar, before the line insertion had
begun], “Are we putting this central line in for the patient's dopa-
mine?” The registrar said “Yes, yes we are”, and the nurse said,
“Well he's only on one millilitre [of the drug] […] I'm not sure the
patient actually needs a line” [the registrar ignored this statement].
Following a difﬁcult failed central line insertion, […] the nurse said
to the registrar, “Well I did say [he didn't need a line] at the start.”
(Field notes, Unit 19)3.4. Problems with mechanisms of social control: reinforcing
idiosyncratic and dysfunctional norms
Processes of social control in the form of challenges and sanc-
tions were very often, but not always, positive actions. On occasion,
theywere oriented towards reinforcing idiosyncratic norms, and, in
some settings, the norms of acceptable practice that had been
established and reinforced were dysfunctional. In a few settings,
some senior individuals e consultants in particular e explicitly
enforced their own idiosyncratic norms and expectations with
more junior physicians. They sanctioned individuals for failures of
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consultants or were not alignedwith evidence-based good practice.
Less hierarchically privileged individuals therefore had to ensure
they avoided committing what Bosk terms quasi-normative errors
(Bosk,1979), errors that are “idiosyncratic; behaviour that would be
formally correct on one service is not so on another” (p64).
Working with different consultants is that I would say, probably
without exception, as registrars we do what the consultant tells us
to do. […] So I've put central lines in with just a pair of gloves with
the [consultant] who does it like that, because that's how he does it,
he won't let you do any other way, and as registrars you're under
pressure to do things as the consultant wants you to do them
….[Otherwise it] makes the rest of your day miserable. (Interview,
junior doctor, Unit 5)
The reliance on some forms of social control, such as bantering,
was also problematic when local norms were dysfunctional.
[Registrar] took abuse, jocular abuse, but abuse, from the two
consultants […] when in accordance with best practice he
requested a surgical cap as part of barrier precautions before
inserting a central venous catheter. The ﬁrst consultant said to the
second consultant, “Ah well, tell him to go get his lucky hat”, and
the second consultant just laughed, [as he] didn't believe in the
evidence for wearing a hat during insertion. (Field notes, Unit 13)
When wrongdoing is collective it is more likely to become
normalised. Further, when dysfunctional norms have been estab-
lished, observers are less likely to label the behaviour as a wrong-
doing, and are more likely to self-censor even if they have concerns
(Ashforth and Anand, 2003). We found some examples of where
clinicians were aware of expectations of good practice but did not
challenge each other for failures of adherence because deviations
had become normalised. This occurred, for example, in relation to
infection prevention and control practices.
On this morning's rounds […] everybody stands either on or just
inside the red line [marking the patients' bed space]. They can't be
bothered with putting an apron on [which they are required to do
as an infection control measure to enter the bed space… So] we all
stood and then yelled at the patients from outside the red lines.
(Fieldnotes, Unit 3)4. Discussion
Use of processes of social control are a prominent feature of day-
to-day functioning in hospitals, as it is in most social environments.
In this ethnographic study across multiple intensive care units, we
saw healthcare workers of all professional roles use challenges and
sanctions to prevent or address actual or potential errors, risky
behaviours and norm violations. These informal techniques alerted
people to when they were at risk of breaching norms or routines of
safe practice; promped individuals to correct their own behaviour;
sanctioned those who had violated norms to bring them in to line;
and made visible and reinforced norms. There was some evidence
of the potential for graduated escalation where low-level chal-
lenges had been unsuccessful, with involvement of third parties or
formal routes seen as the ‘last resort’. Methods of social control,
when they worked well, promoted safety and helped to maintain
cooperative relationship. Our observations thus conﬁrm that exer-
cising ‘voice’ is much more than a problem of communication
techniques (Orasanu and Fischer, 2008); instead, it is better un-
derstood as one important element of the exercise of social control.
Processes of social control are key to the smooth and safefunctioning of interdependent healthcare teams, whose members
rely on cooperative action around common goals and adherence to
norms. Our study identiﬁed a diverse and ﬁne-grained set of stra-
tegies for inﬂuencing the behaviours of others, with evidence that
many of these strategies have endured over time: Freidson and
Rhea (1963), for example, include in their list of “punishments”,
along with the talking to: “various blends of instruction, friendly
persuasion of error, shaming the offender, and threatening him [sic]
with retalitation”. Our work adds to this in elaborating and
extending the forms of sanction that may be used, but also in
emphasising the importance of pre-emptive challenge techniques
that may be used. Both pre-emptions and post-hoc challenges
shared the characteristic that they often involved the public display
of norms and exposure of norm violations, perhaps using humour,
which helped to shape the behaviour of multiple individuals.
When social control works well it may be very effective in
enabling risks to safety to be reduced. It does, however, have lim-
itations. Strategies that rely on peer disapproval to bring people in
line with accepted norms are only effective if colleagues monitor
each others' behaviour and intervene when needed, and when
those who are the target of interventions acknowledge that what
they have been doing is ‘wrong’, and care about the disapproval of
their peers. Recalcitrant or poorly motivated individuals, as well as
individuals who lack skills or who are struggling for other reasons,
may be unwilling or unable to correct their behaviour. The ability to
exercise social control is not equally available to all: hierarchies and
professional boundaries may present barriers (Morrow et al., 2016).
In our study, early-career physicians were often the target of pro-
cesses of social control, consistent with their status as learners, and
in line with the well-documented phenomenon of the hidden
curriculum (Hafferty and Franks, 1994). Yet they may themselves
struggle to challenge others about their practices (Friedman et al.,
2015). The same was true of nurses in contexts that were cultur-
ally unsupportive. This lack of voice is troubling, since it may result
in poorer control of risks to safety, lost opportunities for reﬂective
learning, and inhibited role development.
Further, for all its positives, informal social control has a dark
side: it is norm-based, so it involves efforts to bring others into line
with accepted norms. These norms are often, but not always,
aligned with goals of patient safety and high-quality healthcare.
Sometimes, in our study, processes of control were oriented to-
wards maintaining idiosyncratic or dysfunctional norms. Social
control might also be seen as acting as a form of ‘containment’
(Lindsay et al., 2012), that can mean that opportunities for wider
organisational learning about preventing harm, and organisational
intervention are lost (Sujan et al., 2011).
4.1. Strengths and limitations
A key strength of our study is the abundance of data we were
able to collect across ICUs with diverse characteristics within
diverse hospital environments, and from many personnel in
different roles, generating important insights into fundamental
mechanisms of social control that operate within this acute care
environment. Since our observations and interviews were con-
ducted over a period of a few days in each setting, we do not claim
to have gained a deep understanding of the dynamics within each
setting. We have instead drawn our interpretations from identi-
fying common patterns of interaction, and systematic differences
between the approaches of personnel in different roles and posi-
tions, across the diverse range of settings we visited. Our observers
were non-clinical, meaning that on the one hand they were
perceived as non-threatening and non-judgemental by clinicians in
the settings studied, but on the other hand meant that they may
have missed recognising some opportunities for intervention to
C. Tarrant et al. / Social Science & Medicine 193 (2017) 8e1514prevent or sanction harm. Longer periods of observation and im-
mersion, and a wider range observers, might have generated
insight into the less ‘visible’ forms of social control in operation, as
well as a more complete understanding of the impact of local
context. It might also have enabled further characteristation of
interactions within professional groups (e.g. nurse-nurse, ICU
physician-microbiology consultant, and so on), which would be of
beneﬁt in deepening insight into challenges and sanctions used in
groups and hierarchies.
Our study was conducted in ICUs, which have a number of
features that make them unique and distinct from other acute care
environments. They usually have a much higher staff-patient ratio
than other settings; patients are seriously ill (perhaps sedated and
variably conscious); interactions between healthcare professionals
in ICUs may be different from those settings where patients are
more active witnesses and participants. More generally, the nature
and pattern of social control in other hospital settings, such as
general wards, may differ signiﬁcantly to that observedwithin ICUs.
Observations in non-ICU settings might have enabled exploration
of the possibility that one explanation for the low rate of obser-
vations of nurse-to-nurse processes of social control may lie in the
different line management and supervisory structures used by
nurses, in addition to (or instead of) the speciﬁcs of the ICU setting.
Though an interview-based study into views of raising concerns in
other settings did identify some ﬁndings similar to ours (Jones and
Kelly, 2014b), further investigation is needed.
Our work makes three important contributions to previous
work on social control. First, in contrast to research that has char-
acterised mechanisms of social control among equals (Freidson and
Rhea, 1963), our study explores how healthcare personnel regulate
others' behaviour across professional boundaries and hierarchies in
a company of unequals. In these mixed settings, there is less focus
on a collegium (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011) whose reputation de-
pends on the behaviour of its members, or on a self-regulating ‘in-
group’. Second, much of the literature on social control focuses on
the control of ‘deviants’, or ‘bad apples’ (Kerr et al., 2009), yet we
found that most social control was not about correcting and con-
trolling bad people, but rather was directed at acts of individual
behaviour, and was predicated on the premise that a lot of ‘wrong-
doing’ involves a non-deliberate slip, lapse or mistake, or reﬂects a
lack of awareness of local norms. Finally, the literature on social
control focuses predominantly on punishment and sanctions (or
rewards) in inﬂuencing the behaviour of others (Balliet et al., 2011).
In this paper we have described a spectrum of strategies, many of
them subtle and nuanced, that are brought to bear in exerting in-
ﬂuence on others. Mechanisms of social control involve not just
graduated sanctions (Ostrom, 1990), but extensive use of pre-
emptions and challenges to alert and encourage others to correct
their own behaviour.
4.2. What are the implications of this work?
Though widely promoted internationally, whistleblowing is
reactive. Our study suggests that whistleblowing may be an
approach that personnel are likely to draw on when lower-level
formal controls have failed; these informal routes for speaking
out remain neglected in policy and guidance (Jones and Kelly,
2014a). Our research shows that low-level social control occur-
ring as part of day-to-day functioning in healthcare has a critical
role to play in promoting quality and safety. This renewed under-
standing how safe practice is socially created and controlled pro-
actively is important. Of course, informal mechanisms alone are not
sufﬁcient to manage the problem of poor or unsafe practice
(Freidson and Rhea, 1963; Stelling and Bucher, 1972). Effective
control depends also on having a supportive infrastructure,including the availability of regulatory and/or legal structures that
can take over when informal control mechanisms fail and positive
local norms (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011). Features of environments
likely to promote such norms include a leadership commitment to
supporting challenge (and and learning from challenge), an atmo-
sphere of trust and psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999), and
clear and consistentmessages about “where the linemust be drawn
between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour” (Gallagher et al.,
2013).
Enabling those in hierarchically disadvantaged positions to
challenge poor practice in their day-to-day experience, in the face
of expectations about them as learners, and in the context of their
own developing knowledge and uncertainties (Beament and
Mercer, 2016), is a particular issue of concern. Senior personnel
may need to take active steps to create a culture in which challenge
is welcome, with a focus on shared learning (Edmondson, 2012).
Informal means for raising concerns outside the immediate su-
pervision hierarchy are also likely to be important (Carr et al., 2016).
Healthcare need to feel safe to challenge each other without fear of
rebuff and without damaging relationships; support in how to
manage relationships where giving and responding to challenge is
problematic may also be of value.
4.3. Conclusions
Our study shows why an emphasis on either communication
techniques or formal reporting as the solution to resolving prob-
lems of unsafe practice is simplistic. The giving of voice to concerns
about patient safety in day-to-day clinical care is likely to be best
understood as a one of social control.
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